Recently in Murder Category

Tennessee Supreme Court Grants New Trial for Man Convicted of Killing & Dismembering His Mother

April 30, 2013, by The McKellar Law Firm, PLLC

Tennessee criminal defense attorneys will rarely participate in a murder case as gruesome as the case of David Climer, Jr. Climer, a Gibson County, Tennessee resident, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and abuse of a corpse in relation to the 2007 murder of his mother Doris Deberry. He appealed his conviction to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which granted him a new trial earlier this month based on issues with the waiver of his Miranda rights [See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)]. The full opinion of the Climer decision can be found here.

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This case begins with the disappearance of Doris Deberry, who was David Climer, Jr's. mother. Climer reported to family members that Deberry ran off with a Hispanic male named Ray. The family became suspicious and eventually made a missing persons report which prompted police to go the home that Deberry and Climer shared. Climer was drunk when police first made contact with him, and he was taken into custody and placed in a "drunk tank."

During a custodial interrogation prior to arrest, Climer was read his Miranda rights by a detective. He was then asked to sign a form stating that he had been advised of his rights; however, he refused to sign the document. The detective then proceeded to ask Climer questions regarding the disappearance of his mother. According to the court record, on one occasion Climer stated that he was scared to talk without an attorney. In another instance, Climer asked if he could "have...an appointed lawyer right now," to which the detective told him "...not at this time," and continued to question Climer. After three hours of interrogation, Climer finally confessed that he dismembered his mother's body and buried the body in Madison County, Tennessee.

Climer never confessed to murdering Deberry, and instead claimed that Deberry died from complications from an earlier fall. After an arrest warrant was executed, Climer was brought back in from the "drunk tank" to speak with the detective that conducted the prior interrogation. The detective repeated the Miranda rights to Climer, and Climer again refused to sign the acknowledgment form. During this second interrogation, Climer took the detective to the burial spot of Deberry's remains.

Climer's defense made a motion to suppress the confession, but the trial court denied the request stating there was no evidence of abuse of Climer during the investigation or subsequent incarceration. The trial court also ruled that the Defendant's remarks to the investigator did not amount to Climer invoking his right to counsel. Climer was convicted, and his defense appealed the decision. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, and the case was ultimately appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court.

The question of Climer's invocation of counsel was under de novo review by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court applied Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), which states that a suspect "must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of any attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." 384 U.S. at 479. In addition to the above protection, the Miranda case requires a suspect to "knowingly and intelligently" waive said rights. The Supreme Court also looked to McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) which states that once a suspect invokes a right to counsel, any subsequent waiver at the authorities' request, and not at the suspect's request, is the product of "inherently compelling pressures" and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.

A primary issue which the Supreme Court had to address was whether Climer's statements were actually a stated desire to have an attorney present. The Court looked to Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) in which the Court declared "invocation of the Miranda right to counsel requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney." Id., at 459.

In applying the aforementioned case law, the Supreme Court applied the Davis standard to determine if Climer effectively invoked his right to counsel. The Court examined the transcripts from Climer's interrogations to examine the three instances in which the defense claimed Climer invoked his right. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals that Climer never unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. However, the Court found that Climer never expressly waived his Miranda rights. The Supreme Court pointed to several statements in the interrogation transcripts in which Climer talked about an appointed attorney. The Court concluded that Climer's comments regarding an appointed attorney clearly showed that Climer did not understand his Miranda rights and therefore could not intelligently waive said rights.

After determining that Climer did not unequivocally waive his Miranda rights, the Supreme Court had to determine if the error was harmless or would have impacted the verdict of the case. The Court wrote:

As the United States Supreme Court has observed: "A confession is like no other evidence." Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296. "[T]he defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him." Id. (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)). This is true because a defendant's admissions "come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct." Id. (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 140 (White, J., dissenting)).

The Supreme Court ruled that Climer's statements were not harmless error and reversed his conviction, and remanded the case to the lower court for a retrial consistent with its opinion. The Court also decided that the physical evidence used in Climer's trial (and discovered as a result of his custodial statements) was correctly admitted into evidence since Climer's statements were not coerced. Therefore, the prosecution may use the same physical evidence at Climer's new trial.

Convicted Murderer May Go Free After Improper Use of Informant

October 10, 2010, by The McKellar Law Firm, PLLC

Being a federal criminal defense attorney, I often hear people complain about how criminal defense attorneys will have their clients escape responsibility based on "technicalities" or "loopholes." If you are such a person, you will not be pleased with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Ayers v. Hudson, which was decided on October 5, 2010.

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Ohio resident David Ayers was convicted of murdering 76-year-old Dorothy Brown by striking her repeatedly with a small, black iron. Ayers stole $700 from the victim. Ayers' conviction was based in part on the testimony of a jailhouse informant, who claimed that Ayers had confessed his role in the murder. Ayers appealed his conviction on the basis that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by allowing the jailhouse informant to testify against him.

The Sixth Circuit summarizes this area of the Sixth Amendment:

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. "This right has been
accorded, . . . 'not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the
accused to receive a fair trial.'" Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)). Thus, "once the adversary judicial process has been initiated, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all 'critical' stages of the criminal proceedings." Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009) (citations omitted). "Interrogation by the State is such a stage." Id. at 2085 (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1964); Henry, 447 U.S. at 274). See also Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.25 ("The [Supreme] Court has uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.") (emphasis added).

The Sixth Circuit ultimately decided that the Government's use of the jailhouse informant in Ayers' case violated the Sixth Amendment, and they ordered that Ayers receive a new trial or be released. The Court's reasoning behind its decision rested greatly on the fact that the Court viewed the jailhouse informant as a government agent once the informant had spoken to the police and returned to Ayers for additional questioning.

Additional Resources
David Ayers v. Stuart Hudson, Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, October 5, 2010